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subject to a Bank of Italy''s authorisation. As a consequence of the 1990 "branch liberalisation" there was a collective 
phenomenon of new openings that, in some circumstances, has produced overclustering episodes, due to the lack of 
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     1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the eﬀects of the deregulation of late 1980s and early 1990s
on branch banking dynamics in Italy. In particular, we focus on banks’ location choices
and potential overclustering patterns consequent to banks’ co-movements in an uncertain
decisional context. Our aim is to show that uncoordinated actions in a decentralised system
may produce costly locational errors, due to “excessive entry” in local markets, which may
be reduced through a policy intervention aimed at improving information gathering and
diﬀusion at the system level.
Until the end of the 1980s the Italian banking sector was characterised by a centralised
system according to which the openings of new branches was subject to an administrative
authorisation of the Bank of Italy. As a consequence of the 1990 “branch liberalisation”
banks were free to open new branches in desired locations. This regime change provoked
the opening of a large number of new branches, from about 15000 in 1989 to more than
30000 in 2005. The lack of coordination consequent to the transition from a planned to a
market-oriented system has increased the likelihood of overclustering due to excessive entry
in local markets, a problem that in the past was avoided through a centralised management
of banks’ geographical expansion strategies.
We suggest a biological interpretation of banks’ collective behaviour based on an analogy
between the potential level of deposits banks can collect in a location and the environment’s
carrying capacity for a certain “population”. We analyse behavioural patterns at a diﬀerent
level of spatial aggregation to see whether banks’ co-movements resulted in overclustering
phenomena, that is a growth of the bank branch “population” above the location’s carrying
capacity.
Our analysis of banks’ collective behaviour shows that “distribution matters”: decen-
tralised location choices produce a branch-to-deposit distribution with a right fat tail; being
the level of deposits banks can collect an important variables inﬂuencing branch proﬁtabil-
ity, an excessive “aggregation” in certain locations may lead to the “saturation” of local
resources. This phenomenon has serious implications for banks’ behaviour and can lead to
costly process of restructuring through branch closures. Then, banks may incur in locational
“errors” due to uncoordinated decisions in a deregulated environment. This problem was
avoided through a high rate of refusal in authorising new openings in the period governed by
the Bank of Italy, at the cost of producing an under-dimensioned bank branch network. We
provide an interpretation of branch banking dynamics in alternative organisational settings
(that is, hierarchies vs. polyarchies), along the lines proposed by Sah and Stiglitz (1986),
showing that diﬀerent aggregation of errors produce diﬀerent performances at the system
level.
The paper is organised as follows: after this introduction, the empirical analysis of banks’
location choices and branch-to-deposit ratio dynamics is presented in section 2. In section 3
we discuss the eﬀects of diﬀerent institutional regimes on branch banking dynamics, highlit-
ing the major advantages and disadvantages of hierarchical and polyarchical organisational
structures and the potential role for policy intervention. Section 4 includes some concluding
remarks.
12 Banks’ co-movements and overclustering
The planned system operational until the late 1980s was based on the administrative control
of the Bank of Italy on the openings of new branches in certain locations. One of the goals of
this system was directed to avoid overbranching situations through a centralised management
of banks’ geographical expansion (Comana, 1990). An important factor at the basis of the
Bank of Italy’s decisions was the relationship between the number of banks operating in a
certain location and the level of deposits. According to this indicator the centralised model
was oriented to rationalise the presence of banks on the Italian territory (Banca d’Italia,
1978, 1982). On the other hand, it resulted in an under-dimensioned branch network with
respect to other European countries (Corbellini, 1990).
After the liberalisation the number of bank branches has doubled in approximately 15
years and the Italian branch network has reached (and overcome) the European standard.
On the other hand, in a decentralised setting it is likely that, while a bank is studying
the attractiveness of a local market, other banks are doing the same thing; furthermore
competitors would be in a more advanced stage of the decisional process leading to a location
choice (Comana, 1990). In this context, co-movements of banks towards the same locations
may lead to overclustering phenomena. In other words, deregulation has provoked a lack of
coordination increasing the likelihood of excessive entry in local markets. The increase of
the number of branch closures after deregulation could be at least partially due to the need
of restructuring banks’ branch networks, decreasing the number of branches in “congested”
locations. To empirically assess the relevance of this phenomenon, we provide an analysis of
the spatial distribution of the branch-to-deposit ratio. We investigate behavioural patterns
emerging from banks’ location choices, suggesting a biological analogy between the “carrying
capacity” of an environment and the number of branches a location can support given the
level of banks deposits.1
The decision of opening new branches in certain locations depends on the proﬁtability of
the action. There are many variables aﬀecting proﬁts that banks consider when facing this
decision. A relevant one is the level of deposits that a bank can collect in a given location.
Given that we do not have data on the amount of deposits for each bank branch, in what
follows we consider the Branch-to-Deposit Ratio (henceforth, BDR) as a proxy for branch
proﬁtability in a given municipality.
The median of the 2005 BDR spatial distribution is equal to 0.0668 while the minimum
and maximum values are 0.0011 and 0.3221, respectively. A relevant aspect is that its
skewness is equal to 1.8017, due to the right “fat tail” of the distribution (see Figure 1). The
shape of the distribution is similar for previous years as shown in table I. Then, we observe a
right-skew BDR distribution in all years from 1998 to 2005: we can consider this statistical
regularities as a stylised fact emerging from banks’ location choices. Our hypothesis is that
1Data on bank deposits, loans and bank branches in Italian municipalities (starting from 1998) are avail-
able at the website of the Bank of Italy (www.bancaditalia.it). In general, our dataset contains information
on bank branches in more than 8000 locations, from 1936 to 2005; the number of banks involved is around
2000. We have added to this dataset information on bank deposits in Italian municipalities (for the period
1998-2005).
2the existence of high values of BDR in the right tail of the distribution can be related to
overclustering phenomena due to excessive entry in local markets, given the level of bank
deposits.
Selecting locations in the right tail of the distribution, for instance with BDR> 0.15, we
observe that these locations have a lower number of branches (the median is 3) with respect
to the general case (the median is 5). The median of bank branches is equal to 4 in the
intermediate case with BDR> 0.1. If we set a threshold as the minimum number of branches
per location and look at the BDR spatial distribution we observe that the skewness of the
distribution decreases as the threshold increases (see Figure 2). Then, large values of BDR
are generally associated with medium-small locations (in terms of the number of branches).
Interestingly enough, we do not observe a similar regularity looking at locations with “low”
level of BDR. Therefore, it results that potential overclustering phenomena are more likely
to happen in small locations: if diﬀerent banks collectively decide to open branches in these
locations, it is more likely that the number of branches becomes “excessive” because of the
limited amount of deposits.
From a biological/ecological point of view, we can interpret the potential level of bank
deposits in a certain location as the “carrying capacity” of that geographical site.2 The
carrying capacity of an ecosystem is the supportable population of an organism in terms
of food, water and other characteristics of the habitat, that is the number of individuals
an ecosystem can support without a negative impact on the environment. Typically, when
population density increases, there is a decrease of the birth rate and an increase of the
death rate. Then, population increases below the carrying capacity and decreases above.
According to this biological interpretation, we consider the level of deposits as an indicator
of locations’ carrying capacity. Then, if BDR is “low”, the location can support the number
of existing branches and the stock of bank branches can raise until the “population” is below
the carrying capacity. In the opposite case, the bank branch stock should decrease because
the “population” is above the carrying capacity (that is, BDR is “high”) and the level of
deposits is not suﬃcient to assure positive proﬁts to banks. In our case the “population” is
the stock of bank branches in a location and, according to our view, its growth rate should
display a relationship with BDR, leading to an increase (decrease) of the “population” below
(above) carrying capacity.
We start analysing a quite large fraction of locations in the right tail of the BDR spatial
distribution, selecting those with a value higher than 0.1 in the year 1998 (301 observations).
We refer to this set of locations as high BDR locations. If we consider the evolution of all
locations vs. high BDR locations, what we observe is that growth rates of bank branches
as well as the stock of branches exhibit similar patterns from 1936 to some years before
1998. It is worth noticing that some years before 1998 the number of openings in “selected”
locations shows a remarkable increase with respect to the general case: it seems that banks
collectively decide to open branches in these locations, resembling a “following the herd
behaviour”. After 1998, given an increased BDR ratio, banks decide to decrease the ﬂow
of branch openings and to close some branches (see Figure 3). The analysis of stocks gives
2Thanks to Massimiliano Riggi (UnicreditGroup) for his suggestions on this point.
3support to the divergence of dynamic patterns around 1998 (see Figure 4).3
The next step of the analysis is aimed at understating whether the choice of higher thresh-
olds for selecting high BDR locations may provide a more comprehensible interpretation of
the phenomenon. Following the same procedure, we select locations with BDR> 0.15 in
1998 (78 observations). Even in this case we observe that the global pattern (all locations)
and the pattern of high BDR locations are similar until some years before 1998. The high
values of BDR observed in 1998 in “selected” locations was the result of the co-movements of
banks following similar location choices. As a consequence, banks decided to stop the open-
ing process and close some branches. Accordingly, growth rates of bank branches become
negative in last years (see Figure 5) and the decision of closing branches in these locations
resulted in a decrease of the stock of bank branches (see Figure 6).
Furthermore, if we repeat the same exercise, choosing successive years to select high
BDR locations, we observe the same behavioural pattern (see Figure 7). For last years (for
example, 2005) we observe only the ﬁrst part of the phenomenon (that is, an aggregation
pattern).
Banks’ collective behaviour reveals an “overshooting” pattern in branch location choices.
The ﬁrst part of the dynamics is characterised by co-movements of banks opening new
branches in certain locations. As a consequence of this aggregation phenomenon, BDR
increases, potentially leading to a decrease of branch proﬁtability. This period is associated
to growth rates of branch openings in high BDR locations higher than in the global case.
Banks’ decisions can be the result of independent choices (each of which evaluating the
proﬁtability of diﬀerent locations) as well as the consequence of herding dynamics due to the
decision of imitating others’ location choices (given the uncertainty about alternatives). The
decreased attractiveness of locations with high BDR leads to the end of branch openings and
also to some closures, with an inversion of branch banking dynamics and a decrease of the
stock of branches in these locations.
Following the biological analogy, when the “population” of bank branches increases above
locations’ carrying capacity there is a negative impact on the environment because of a
scarcity of resources to sustain individuals. In other words, co-movements of banks towards
the same locations produce a “saturation” of resources (with an expected decrease of branch
proﬁtability that we relate to the increase of BDR). This aggregation pattern typically re-
sembles a “following the herd behaviour”, as noted above. Then, the environment needs a
negative “natural increase” to re-establish a viable ratio between population and resources.
Consequently, we observe negative growth rates of the bank branch stock in high BDR lo-
cations, that is an overshooting pattern resulting in a costly process of reorganisation of the
banks’ network due to branch closures in saturated locations.
3It is just the case to note that locations with medium-small values of BDR do not follow a similar patter.
In these cases the evolution of bank branches replicates the global dynamic or shows a higher growth rate.
43 Branch banking dynamics in Italy: organisational
settings and locational errors
According to Sah and Stiglitz (1986), the architecture of diﬀerent systems has an important
role related to information spreading and, in particular, to the aggregation of errors. The
diﬀerent organisation of economic systems can explain diﬀerences in overall performances.
Two alternative types of architecture are “polyarchies” (systems in which there are inde-
pendent and possibly competing sources of decision making) and “hierarchies” (systems in
which the decision making authority is more concentrated). Using the analogy from classical
theory of statistical inference, Sah and Stiglitz (1986) show that “hierarchies” tend to display
a greater incidence of Type-I errors (projects which are rejected should have been accepted)
while “polyarchies” tend to display a greater incidence of Type-II errors (projects which get
accepted should have been rejected).4
As said above, the centralised system was successful in avoiding excessive entry but it
produced an under-dimensioned branch network with respect to other European countries.
Corbellini (1990) maintains that in 1990 the “distance” between the Italian branch network
and that typical of European countries, produced by the strict application of controls on
banking retail, was quite elevated: according to the author a rough estimate of the growth
potential of the branch network indicated that Italy needed about 15000 units to reach the
European standard. In fact, the stock of bank branches in Italy, that was equal to about
15000 branches in 1989, has overcome 30000 units in recent years. In a long-run perspective,
consider that between 1936 and 1985 the number of bank oﬃces grew 87% in Italy; during
the same period the number of bank oﬃces in United States increased by 1228% (Guiso et
al., 2007).
In other words, the centralised system rejected some (locational) projects that should
have been accepted. After the liberalisation the Italian branch network has reached (and
overcome) the European standard. On the other hand, some episodes of excessive entry
has happened as a consequence of the decentralised decision making. Hence, a problem of
decentralised systems due to the lack of coordination is that of accepting (locational) projects
that would have been rejected.
Given that, it emerges a potential role for policy intervention aimed at rationalising the
expansion of the bank branch network, mitigating the tendency of decentralised systems to
incur in Type-II errors. According to Ciocca et al. (1974), as a consequence of limitations
to agents’ information, even in a decentralised banking system it emerges the problem of
gathering additional information on banks’ decisions about the number and the location of
branches. Independently of the control on openings, the monopolistic competition nature of
banking markets may result in a costly process of competition through new openings instead
4According to Sah and Stiglitz (1986), if agents decisions are completely faultless then the architecture
of the economic ceases to be a relevant issue. In this case there are no diﬀerences between the performances
of a polyarchy and a hierarchy. This is true when, in absence of uncertainty on the outcomes of projects,
one assumes that there are no diﬀerences between projects which are “worth selecting” and those which are
“actually selected”.
5that prices, increasing the overall cost of banking services to the collectivity.
A “third party” agent (for instance, the Central Bank) could collect information on banks’
“desired” locations to open new branches in order to evaluate the likelihood of excessive
entry in local markets and avoid potential overclustering phenomena. According to the
biological analogy, the “third party” agent would have the role of evaluating the evolution of
locations’ carrying capacity as a consequence of actual and expected banks’ location choices.
Broadly speaking, this policy intervention should be addressed to provide disincentives to
multi-locations in saturated sites and incentives to bank branch openings in under-served
locations.5
4 Concluding remarks
We have proposed an empirical and theoretical analysis of banks’ collective behaviour, fo-
cussing on bank branch location choices in the Italian territory in the post-liberalisation
period. In a decentralised setting, banks’ collective behaviour, involving autonomous deci-
sions (e.g., independent evaluations of the proﬁtability of locations) and/or herding dynamics
(e.g., the simple imitation of others’ strategies), may result in the saturation of local resources
when the number of branches becomes excessive with respect to bank deposits. Our empirical
analysis on location choices shows that, in some circumstances, banks’ co-movements may
produce higher values of the branch-to-deposit ratio, increasing the likelihood of overcluster-
ing phenomena. In a biological/ecological perspective, the population of bank branches may
grow above the environment’s carrying capacity, generating a situation that requires some
periods of negative growth to re-establish an appropriate ratio between the population (e.g.,
bank branches) and local resources (e.g., bank deposits).
The right-skew shape of the BDR spatial distribution (a banking sector stylised fact
emerging from data analysis in successive years) suggests that these events are possible. To
test the hypothesis according to which high BDR locations can be involved in overclusetring
phenomena, we investigate the consequences of high BDR values on branch banking dy-
namics. The typical pattern we ﬁnd in high BDR locations, selected according to a certain
threshold of BDR in a given year, is the following: (i) banks collectively move towards cer-
tain locations, producing an increase of BDR; during this phase, the growth rate of bank
branches in these locations is higher than the aggregate growth rate; (ii) the opening of new
branches may become excessive with respect to the level of deposits banks can collect; this
situation produces a decrease of bank branches’ growth rate that, in some cases (e.g., the
observations in the right tail of the BDR distribution), may produce a decrease of the bank
branch stock. Accordingly, it emerges an overshooting pattern, due to banks’ co-movements
resulting in an excessive entry in local market and a saturation of resources, which implies
5Chang et al. (1997) suggested a similar policy advice. Analysing bank branch location choices in New
York City (1990-1995), the authors show that “banks are more likely to open branches in tracts where there
are already other branches, ceteris paribus” (Chang et al., 1997, p. 4). This tendency “could produce a
distribution of bank branches that is more skewed than the demographic and economic factors that aﬀect
branch proﬁtability, and may justify policy intervention” (Chang et al. 1997, p. 4).
6a consequent decrease of the bank branch stock in high BDR locations. It is worth noticing
that an overshooting phenomenon represents a costly process of reorganisation of the bank
branch network, operating through the closures of branches in excess with respect to local
resources.
The theoretical framework proposed by Sah and Stiglitz (1986), on the aggregation of
errors in diﬀerent organisational settings, allows us to discuss the role of alternative struc-
tures of the banking system in shaping branch banking dynamics and locational errors: the
centralised system operating until the late 1980s succeeded in avoiding overbranching (low
rate of Type-II errors) at the cost of producing an under-dimensioned bank branch network
(high incidence of Type-I errors); on the other hand, the decentralised system emerged after
the 1990 “branch liberalisation” has resulted in a remarkable growth of the bank branch
network, reaching the typical size of other European countries (low rate of Type-I errors),
at the cost of producing some overclustering phenomena (high incidence of Type-II errors).
We maintain that the performances of decentralised systems may be improved through
a policy intervention aimed at mitigating their tendency to incur in Type-II errors, that is
to accept (locational) project which should have been rejected, minimising the likelihood of
overclustering phenomena due to uncoordinated location choices in an uncertain decisional
context. In other words, a “third party” agent could improve information gathering and
diﬀusion at the system level, providing an appropriate incentive structure to rationalise the
evolution of the bank branch network.
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Figure 1: BDR distribution: year 2005






























Figure 2: 2005 BDR distribution for diﬀerent threshold: (a) 3 branches (skewness=1.7541);
(b) 5 branches (skewness=1.3685); (c) 10 branches (skewness=1.0024); (d) 15 branches
(0.5337)
























Figure 3: Growth rates of bank branches from 1936 to 2005: all locations (solid line) vs. high
BDR locations (dashed line). High BDR locations are selected according to the following
threshold: BDR> 0.10.


























































Figure 4: Total number of bank branches from 1936 to 2005: all locations (solid line) vs. high
BDR locations (dashed line). High BDR locations are selected according to the following
threshold: BDR> 0.10























Figure 5: Growth rates of bank branches from 1936 to 2005: all locations (solid line) vs. high
BDR locations (dashed line). High BDR locations are selected according to the following
threshold: BDR> 0.15


































































Figure 6: Total number of bank branches from 1936 to 2005: all locations (solid line) vs. high


























































































































































Figure 7: Total number of bank branches from 1975 to 2005: all locations (solid line) vs. high
BDR locations (dashed line). High BDR locations are selected according to the threshold
BDR> 0.15 in the following years: (a) 1999; (b) 2001; (c) 2003; (d) 2005.
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